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right upon thing. The court's meaning in the use of this term
is shown by its opinion in Reagan v. Murphy22 where it was held
that a mineral lease creates only personal rights. Defendant's
right to after-acquired minerals being personal against the lessor
could not be asserted against the plaintiff, the new landowner.
The court found nothing in Civil Code Article 2015 which im-
posed such an obligation on the vendor.
In summary, the instant case indicates that there is a duty
on the part of a mineral lessor to inform the lessee within a
reasonable time of an error in payment of delay rentals even
where that error is unilateral on the part of the lessee. It shows
that the doctrine of after-acquired title will not be applied where
the language of the contract or the surrounding circumstances
show that the lessee has already received everything for which
he bargained. It indicates that lease clauses binding the lessor
and his successors to include future-acquired minerals in the
lease will be given effect as between the parties to the lease, but
squarely holds that they have no effect on future purchasers of
the land.
William M. Nolen
MUNICIPAL ZONING ORDINANCES - LAX ENFORCEMENT A BAR TO
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The City of New Orleans, seeking removal of artifices in
violation of an ordinance passed for the preservation of the
"architectural and historical value"' of the Vieux Carr6 in New
Orleans, sought a mandatory injunction against the defendant
restaurant owner, who had previously been fined for the same
violation.2 The city had made no attempt to enjoin others for
similar violations. In addition, some violators were fined while
still others went totally unmolested.8 The lower court issued the
injunction. On rehearing on appeal the Supreme Court held,
reversed. Failure of the city to prosecute others did not deny
equal protection of the law under the Federal Constitution be-
22. 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (La. 1958), 19 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 207.
1. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 22A, implemented in New Orleans City Code, §§ 1-6
(1956). See also New Orleans v. Impastato, 198 La. 206, 3 So.2d 559 (1941)
(legislation held constitutional).
2. New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So.2d 798 (1953).
3. The city had not attempted to enjoin other violators of the zoning ordinance,
and, in addition, permits had been issued to others in the zoned area, which per-
mits allowed construction of artifices which otherwise would have violated the
ordinance. Defendant had been denied such a permit.
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cause purposeful or intentional discrimination was not shown.
However, the city's conduct precluded issuance of the injunction
under the doctrine that he who seeks equitable relief must do
so with clean hands. New Orleans v. Levy, 233 La. 844, 98 So.2d
210 (1957).
The normal mode for enforcement of municipal ordinances
is by fine and/or imprisonment. 4 Where the offender places a
high value on the particular violation, it may be that neither
fine nor imprisonment will be effective to force a cessation of
the forbidden act.5 When such is the case, the municipality may
resort to the injunction.6 Such injunctions have been resisted on
the grounds that other violators have not been prosecuted or en-
joined, but this defense has heretofore been unsuccessful.7 The
mere fact that there have been other unrestrained violations does
not have the effect of repealing the zoning ordinance sought to
be enforced. 8 An ordinance violation is never justified merely
because there are other violations which are unrestrained.9 Even
where a city has allowed the defendant himself to violate the or-
dinance over a period of years, it has not been estopped from
bringing injunction proceedings. 0 If a city's failure to enforce
an ordinance against others was purposefully and intentionally
4. 5 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 17.07 (3d ed. 1949). See New
Orleans City Code §§ 1-6 (1956), the ordinance involved in the instant case, which
provides that violations shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred
dollars and/or by imprisonment for not more than 90 days.
The following Louisiana cases have dealt with the subject of penalties for
violating municipal ordinances: New Orleans v. Mangiarisina, 139 La. 605, 71 So.
886 (1916) (unless it is provided otherwise in the ordinance, each day's occurrence
will not constitute a separate violation, and the violation is punishable only once) ;
New Orleans v. Stein, 137 La. 652, 69 So. 43 (1915) (an ordinance is ineffective
where there is no penalty) ; Shreveport v. P. Draiss & Co., 111 La. 511, 35 So.
727 (1904) (penalties in ordinance are not to exceed power of municipality to
penalize).
5. In the instant case plaintiff had been previously fined $10.00 by the trial
judge, who, although he found a technical violation of the ordinance, believed the
appearance of the Vieux Carr6 had been improved. New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La.
14, 64 So.2d 798 (1053).
6. City of San Mateo v. l-lardy, 64 Cal. App.2d 794, 149 P.2d 307 (1944)
City of Louisville v. Koenig, 290 Ky. 562, 162 S.W.2d 19, 140 A.L.R. 1369 (1942)
New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798 (1924) ; Lake Charles v.
Lake Charles Ry. Light & Water Co., 144 La. 217, 80 So. 260 (1919).
7. Riggs v. City of Hot Springs, 181 Ark. 377, 26 S.W.2d 70 (1930) ; Flint v.
Treadwell, 207 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1949) ; Stocks v. Lee, 144 Fla. 716, 198 So. 211
(1940) ; Village of Riverside v. Kuhne, 335 Ill. App. 547, 82 N.E.2d 500 (1948),
appeal transferred, 397 Ill. 108, 73 N.E.2d 286 (1948).
8. Flint v. Treadwell, 207 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1949).
9. Village of Riverside v. Kuhne, 335 Ill. App. 547, 82 N.E.2d 500 (1948),
appeal transferred, 397 Ill. 108, 73 N.E.2d 286 (1948).
10. Murray v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 137 N.J.L. 106, 58 A.2d 228(1948) (allowed injunction against Murray after continued violation of ordinance
for several years).
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discriminatory, it would seem that a defendant might resist en-
forcement of the ordinance against himself on constitutional
grounds. No cases were found wherein the enforcement of a
zoning ordinance was thus held to constitute a denial of equal
protection of the law under the Federal Constitution. However,
intentional or purposeful discrimination by public authorities in
the application or enforcement of other types of laws has been
held unconstitutional." The city's action, to be unconstitutional,
would have to be intentional, systematic, deliberate, persistent,
habitual, fraudulent, or designed; error in judgment or mistake
would not be sufficient. 12
The instant case appears to be the first in which the "clean
hands" maxim was used to deny a city an injunction against
violations of municipal zoning ordinances. The "clean hands"
maxim is an equitable doctrine which generally demands of
suitors a record of no improper conduct as regards the subject
matter of litigation. 13 "Unclean hands" has been held to be that
conduct which is offensive to the dictates of natural justice,1 4 or
conduct Which has been condemned by honest and reasonable
men.' r5 A Louisiana case held that a finding of "unclean hands"
could not be based on a technical violation of the law, but re-
quired evil intent or wilful misconduct. 16 In other Louisiana
cases, the courts have made no attempt at definition, but have
merely stated the facts and applied the maxim without elabora-
tion.' 7 Although the absence of evil intention may be a reason
11. E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discrimination in refus-
ing license to Chinese laundryman violated equal protection clause of United
States Constitution) ; Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1943) (action not uncon-
stitutional in absence of intentional and purposeful discrimination where second
place candidate in primary was refused certification for general election). See
People v. Amdur, 267 P.2d 445 (1954). See also Note, 32 TUL. L. REV. 306
(1958).
12. Interstate Oil Pipeline Co. v. Guilbeau, 217 La. 160, 46 So.2d 113 (1950).
13. 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 397 (5th ed. 1941). See Harton v.
Little, 188 Ala. 640, 65 So. 951 (1914) ; Allstead v. Laumeister, 16 Cal. App. 59,
116 Pac. 296 (1911) ; Miller v. Jackson Township, 178 Ind. 503, 99 N.E. 102
(1912) ; Caines v. Sawyer, 248 Mass. 368, 143 N.E. 326 (1924). See also Annot.,
4 A.L.R. 44 (1919).
14. Mas v. Coca-Cola Co., 163 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1947) (included any real
unconscientious conduct); Moates v. City of Andalusia, 254 Ala. 629, 49 So.2d
294 (1949) ; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Schwartz, 133 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct. 1954)
(included unlawful, unconscionable, or inequitable conduct).
15. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806 (1945) ; Roberts v. Roberts, 84 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1956).
16. Anders v. McConnell, 31 So.2d 237 (La. App. 1947).
17. Bridges v. Trevino, 64 So.2d 528 (La. App. 1953); Coker v. Supreme
Industrial Life Ins. Co., 43 So.2d 556 (La. App. 1950).
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for refusing to apply the maxim,' 8 the wide discretion 19 which
the courts may exercise under the above tests suggests that un-
intentional conduct could fall within the maxim.2 0  Conversely,
this same discretion will allow a court to refuse to apply the
maxim regardless of how reprehensible a plaintiff's conduct may
have been if public policy so demands.
21
Since it has been said that a city occupies the same position
as any private individual when seeking injunctive relief,2 2 the
application of the "clean hands" maxim in the instant case seems
logical. This conclusion appears questionable since it has been
the general rule that a city will not be denied injunctive relief
merely because others in addition to the defendant are guilty of
the same violation and have not been restrained. 23 Since the city
in such an action seeks to protect and enforce a public right, a
favored position in this regard would appear justified. For these
reasons, it has been held that laches or delay in enforcement of
zoning ordinances does not preclude injunctive relief.2 4 This con-
sideration may explain the marked absence of any prior applica-
tion of the maxim in cases similar to the instant case.
Apart from technical arguments against applying the maxim,
certain practical considerations suggest that it should have no
18. See, e.g., Anders v. McConnell, 31 So.2d 237 (La. App. 1947) (technical
violation of game statute, in absence of evil intent or wilful violation of law, did
not estop plaintiff in suit against game agents who trespassed).
19. Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288, 179 So. 430 (1938) (although plaintiff may
have married accomplice in adultery in knowing violation of law, the court has
great discretion in deciding whether to apply the maxim).
20. See Bridges v. Trevino, 64 So.2d 528 (La. App. 1953) (where several
heirs sat idly by for 20 years after co-heirs had bought property at a tax sale, the
former were held to be estopped to assert any claim to said property by way of
redemption).
21. Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288, 179 So. 430 (1938) (even though relief
was sought by an adulterous party, the court found public order best served by
granting the divorce. In doing so, it refused to apply the "clean hands" maxim
to bar the action).
22. New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798 (1924) ; Town of
Clinton v. Ross, 226 N.C. 682, 40 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1946) ("There is no special
authority conferred upon the plaintiff by its character which may be construed
to vest power in it to resort to equity for aid in enforcing its ordinances. Its
anomalous position in seeking the aid of equity . . . can be maintained . . . only
under the recognized principles controlling the exercise of equity jurisdiction ....
[P]laintiff comes into court as any other litigant with no distinction drawn in its
favor"). See also 17 McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 49.57 (3d ed.
1949).
23. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
24. See Town of Lincoln v. Giles, 317 Mass. 185, 57 N.E.2d 554 (1944)
(granted injunction to city even though official charged with enforcement was
guilty of laches and delay that might bar an individual's action, because city was
enforcing a public and not a private right).
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application.25 The lack of a clear standard as to what consti-
tutes "unclean hands" will make the enforcement of zoning ordi-
nances highly uncertain. Changes in city administrations and
practical problems of law enforcement 26 will offer fertile
grounds for uncertainty in the application of the maxim. If un-
clean hands means conduct short of intentional or purposeful
misconduct, the result may be judicial eradication of otherwise
valid ordinances. Thus, in the instant case, although the city had
made efforts to enforce the ordinance, and had not engaged in
purposeful or intentional misconduct, the failure to enforce it
against all violators destroyed the effectiveness of the ordi-
nance.27 Since it is so uncertain as to what conduct short of in-
tentional or purposeful misconduct will constitute "unclean
hands," it is submitted that only the constitutional test of inten-
tional or purposeful misconduct should bar a city from injunctive
enforcement of zoning ordinances. Thus, the application of the
"clean hands" maxim to zoning ordinance cases seems both un-
desirable and unnecessary.
Leslie J. Schiff
PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE--DEFEAT OF RECORD TITLE BY REASON
OF "NOTICE" OF UNRECORDED TAx REDEMPTION CERTIFICATE
Plaintiff brought suit to quiet and confirm his tax title, rely-
ing on the public records doctrine as a third party purchaser.
Plaintiff's title was derived from the heirs of the tax adjudi-
catee. Defendant's title traced back to the heir of the tax debtor
who had been placed in possession of the property by an ex parte
judgment of possession which was rendered after the tax sale.
The debtor's heir timely redeemed the property but failed to
record the redemption certificate within the redemption period.
This heir subsequently conveyed the property to third parties in
whose name the property was assessed, the heir or her vendees
25. See Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288, 179 So. 430 (1938) (public policy
reasons may demand non-application of the maxim).
26. See concurring opinion of Justice McCaleb in New Orleans v. Levy, 233
La. 844, 98 So.2d 210 (1957) (city had tried to enforce ordinance against several
violators with no success because of crowded court dockets, difficulties of serving
some defendants with notice and continuances granted by courts).
27. This does not mean that the ordinance was made ineffective as regards the
imposition of penalties. The ineffectiveness referred to here stems only from the
fact that an injunction was the only remaining way in which the violation could
be stopped, since the defendant had already paid a fine, and could not be fined
again. or imprisoned. See New Orleans v. Mangiarisina, 139 La. 605, 71 So. 880
(1916).
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